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INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT WITH WAGE RIGIDITY*
William H. BRANSON and Julio J. ROTEMBERG
NBER, and Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
1. Background and introduction
Since 1974 the OECD area has seen several attempts at recovery from the
1974-75 recession, but the result has been stagnation. The recovery of 1975-
77 in the United States took it well ahead of the rest of the OECD in the
business cycle, even though the unemployment rate reached a low of only 5.7
percent. The U.S. recovery led to a massive increase in its current account
deficit and the sharp depreciation of the dollar in 1978. The 'balance of
payments constraint' on uncoordinated recovery reappeared as an 'exchange-
rate constraint'.
In November 1978, U.S. policy shifted sharply toward restraint and
support for the dollar; the shift was announced publicly by President Carter.
Demand policy has remained tight ever since, especially with monetary
policy tightening in West Germany in 1979. The tightening of U.S. policy
simply recognizes that the U.S. cannot attempt recovery significantly faster
than Europe or Japan. The OECD countries appear to be locked into a
system in which economic growth is significantly limited by the growth rate
of the slowest major participant. The result of the shift in policy is renewed
recession and rising unemployment throughout the OECD area.
The constraining factor in the stagnation since 1974 seems to be the
difficulty of recovery, or reluctance to stimulate demand, in Europe and
Japan. The question we address is: why is recovery so hard in Europe and
Japan? During 1976-77 the OECD policy debate on recovery was mainly
the U.S. suggesting (more or less politely) that the countries in 'strong'
current account positions, Japan and West Germany, take the lead, and
those governments either refusing or reluctantly proposing fairlytimid
measures. Essentially their position was that rapid demand expansion would
lead only to more inflation, with no significant gains in real output.
One popular explanation for the policy difference between the U.S. and,
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mainly, West Germany was that their sensitivity to or expectations of
inflation differed. Another could be that the implicit model behind the
German view was a texbook 'classical' model with no money illusion and
fully flexible wages and prices, while the implicit U.S. model has sticky wages
or money illusion. Thi view of the German economy did not seemrealistic.
A more satisfactory model of the European side was presented by Herbert
Giersch when he talked in Princeton in March, 1978. Our interpretation of
his view was that the German real wage was rigid, at least downward, above
its equilibrium value. This model would give the 'classical' results that
demand expansion only raises prices with no effect on output, but not in a
flexible wage-and-price context. As we see in section 2 below, an assumption of
real-wage rigidity of this sort in Europe and Japan plus nominal wage
stickiness in the U.S. would make sense of the 1976-77 policy debate.
As an initial check on the empirical plausibility of this model, we perused
the time-series data on real wage rates in major OECD countries.If
differences between real-wage and nominal-wage rigidities were a major
feature of the OECD economies, they should appear in the 1974 recession,
with rigid real wages resisting the downturn more than sticky nominal
wages. This is especially true with the oil price increase.
The time-series data are summarized in table 1. There we see that the only
country with a protracted decline on real wages in the 1973-75 period was
the United States. There the real-wage index peaked at 1.042 in 1973 :2, and
did not pass the level again until 1975 :2. In Germany, real-wage growth
continued straight through the recession until 1976. In Italy and Japan, there
was a pause in 1974, with growth resuming by the beginningof 1975. In the
U.K., the real-wage index continued to grow to mid-1976, with pauses in
1974 : 2 and in mid-1975. These data provide some initial support for the
hypothesis, and were the basis for an informal discussion of itat the
International Seminar on Macroeconomics in 1978. This paper reports on
our continuing theoretical and empirical investigationof demand policy in a
series of models with differing types of wage rigidity across countries.
In section 2 of the paper we develop a model of two countries with one
commodity and purchasing-power-parity (PPP). Here we obtain the clear-cut
Giersch results. Expansion in the country with rigid real wages raises the
world price level, increases output in the country with rigid nominal wages,
and also reduces that country's trade deficit.
The clarity of these results is blurred in section 3, where we study a model
with two commodities and do not assume PPP. This is the same general
framework used by Bruno and Sachs (1979) and Argy and Salop (1978). The
main differences are that the section 3 model is analytic and focuses on
effects of demand policy, while the BrunoSachs several-country model is
solved by simulation and focuses on analysis of stagflation. Argy and Salop
look only at supply-side conditions, while we study demand and supply. AsWH. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity 15
Table 1
Index of real hourly compensation of employees for selected OECD countries.
we see in table 3, the Bruno-Sachs and Argy-Salop results can be viewed as
special cases of ours.
The reason that the clear-cut Gierschresultsarelostinthe two-
commodity caseisthat the relevant prices for workers' and, producers'
decisions are 4ifferent (as in Bruno-Sachs and Argy-Salop). Producers look
at the price of domestic output; workers look at a CPI with imports in it as
well. Thus even if the real wage relative to the CPI is rigid, if a demand
expansion at home pulls up the price of domestic output relative to the CPI,
employment and output expands. Only if exchange-rate adjustment were
immediate and complete, putting us back in the section 2 PPP world, would
the difference not appear. The result is that, in section 3, we see that the
degree of 'money illusion', or real wage vs. nominal-wage stickiness, is at
Year Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
1971:1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1971 :2 0.997 1.036 1.024 1.025 1.001
1971:3 1.029 1.058 1.053 1.012 1.003
1971:4 1.031 1.049 1.065 1.025 1.003
1972:1 1.057 1.057 1.116 1.037 1.016
1972:2 1.067 1.095 1.116 1.076 1.023
1972:3 1.076 1.111 1.124 1.069 1.027
1972:4 1.086 1.176 1.197 1.072 1.030
1973:1 1.119 1.177 1.142 1.064 1.042
1973:2 1.125 1.236 1.173 1.080 1.036
1973:3 1.139 1.259 1.222 1.088 1.034
1973:4 1.147 1.270 1.307 1.088 1.029
1974:1 1.161 1.255 1.169 1.121 1.018
1974:2 1.196 1.317 1.280 1.120 1.024
1974:3 1.228 1.277 1.305 1.164 1.024
1974:4 1.245 1.293 1.305 1.190 1.032
1975:1 1.262 1.356 1.340 1.204 1.041
1975:2 1.265 1.369 1.311 1.186 1.049
1975:3 1.276 1.414 1.307 1.191 1.047
1975:4 1.282 1.390 1.312 1.203 1.051
1976:1 1.277 1.391 1.312 1.208 1.057
1976:2 1.279 1.407 1.300 1.221 1.072
1976:3 1.294 1.434 1.300 1.217 1.075
1976:4 1.300 1.401 1.313 1.192 1.082
1977:1 1.298 1.391 1.309 1.168 1.085
1977:2 1.318 1.418 1.314 1.150 1.086
1977:3 1.319 1.415 1.324 1.155 1.095
1977:4 1.348 1.423 1.339 1.174 1.103
1978:1 1.331 1.441 1.343 1.195 1.112
1978:2 1.364 1.421 1.345 1.227 1.106
1978:3 1.362 1.421 1.349 1.232 1.109
1978:4 1.385 1.432 1.362 1.248 1.10916 W. H. Bianson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjusiiiwiit wit!, ;tage rigidity
least as important as actual-wage rigidity for sorting out the effects of
demand policy.
In section 4 we report some empirical tests of wage rigidity and money
illusion for five major OECD countries (U.S., U.K., Japan, Italy, Germany)
on time-series data since1961. The sample issplitat 1971 to seeif
parameters have changed in the 1970s. An important thing to note about our
table 4 regressions is that they report equations for gradual adjustment of
wage levels, with lagged wages and the level of demand as regressors. This
formulation follows from the theory of sections 2 and 3, where wage rigidities
are stated in terms of the relevant wage level. Bruno and Sachs (1979, p. 16)
have the same basic theoretical structure but estimate Phillips-type equations
with the wage change depending on the level of demand.
The empirical results give us a classification as follows. The U.S. stands
out as the only country with short-run stickiness of nominal-wage rates. The
U.K., Japan, Germany, and Italy all seem to have gradual adjustment of real
wages, consistent with effective indexation. In all five countries, response of
the relevant wage to demand pressure is much less in the 1970s than over the
entire period. These results are consistent with the Giersch hypothesis
extended to the OECD.
2. Wage rigidities in the PPP model
In this section we develop the simplest macro model with wage rigidities
that yields interesting results for the effects of demand policy. The model has
two countries and one commodity (the 'schmoo'), and assumes that the 'law
of one price' holds, so that thereis one world price,P, for the one
commodity.1 We hold the exchange rate constant at unity; alternatively we
could assume two different domestic prices for the commodity, P and P",
with the exchange rate e defined by P=eP*. We begin with the specification
of aggregate supply conditions, then move on to demand in each country
Table 2
Definition of variables.
y = domestic output
P = price index for y
W = nominal-wage rate
w = real-wage rate
K = capital stock
gexogenous component of demand in real terms
a = real absorption
x = real net exports
* = superscript for the 'foreign' country
'Sec table 2 for definition of variables.WH. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity 17
and determination of the equilibrium price level. Next we study the effects of
demand policy and the consequences of different forms of wage rigidity.
2.1. Labor market and aggregate supply
On the demand side of the labor market we have a production function
and a marginal productivity condition which yields the labor demand
function
y=y(N,K),YN>°, yNN<°,[production function] (1)
yK>O, yNK<O
w = W/P = YN (N, K). [demand wage] (2)
In an equilibrium model, we would add a labor-supply function w==ws(N),
and solve for equilibrium w and N. Here we assume that alternately either
the nominal wage or the real wage is rigid above its equilibrium value. We
assume that with the relevant wage rigid aboveitsequilibriumlevel,
employment is determined along the labor-demand function. This is the
familiar minimum condition in non-market-clearing models.2 Thus if the
wage rigidity is effective, labor is constrained in the amount of hours that
employers will buy. This is consistent with the specification of the demand
side in the next subsection.
In the case of the real-wage rigidity we have w= 3> equilibrium w, and
employment is determined along the labor-demand function
WYN(N,K). (3)
This gives us N as a function of 3and the production technology, and
through (1) it fixes y from the supply side. This is similar to the textbook
'classical' model [see Branson (1979)] and is illustrated in fig. 1.
With a nominal wage rigidity we have
W=Py(N,K) (4)
asthe labor-market equilibrium(butnon-clearing) condition. Thisis
illustrated in fig. 2. The response of employment and aggregate supply to a
change in the price level is obtained from total differentiation of (4) and the
production function (1),
dN/dPI.., = yN/yNN>0,dy/dP YN(dN/dP)> (5)
dK=O dI(






Labor market Aggregate supply
Fig. 2. Nominal-wage rigidity.




An increase in the capital stock shifts out the supply curve in figs. 1 and 2.
Thus with the rigid nominal wage we can write the aggregate supply function
of fig. 2(b) as
y=y(P,K),Yp°, Yx0, (7)
N0 Y0=y(N0;K) V
Labor market Aggregate supply
Fig. 1. Real-wage rigidity.
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with a rigid real wage yp=O; with a rigid nominal wage y>O.
In the two-country model we will assume that each country has an
aggregate supply function of the form y=y(P,K). The 'home' country will be
identified by unstarred variabless; the 'foreign' country by stars. Thus the
two aggregate supply functions are
v = r(P,K), (8a)
y*y*(p,K*). (8b)
Remember that there is only one world price level.
In the solution for equilibrium and comparative statics below we first
assume yp>O; y >0 in general. Then when we analyze the effects of differing
wage rigidities on the results of demand policy we will assume the 'home'
country has a real-wage rigidity so that y=O, and the 'foreign' country has
a nominal-wage rigidity with y >0. The effects of changes in investment will
come in only when we discuss policy to adjust to a real-wage rigidity, so we
omit the K argument in y and y" until we reach that discussion.
2.2. Demand and equilibrium P
With rigid wages above equilibrium in both countries, real absorption will
be a function of income, the price level, and a demand policy variable.
IncomeappearsthroughaKeynesianeffective-demandconsumption
function. The price level represents a real balance effect with predetermined
outside money. The demand policy variable can be thought of as the real
deficit, or real government purchases with given tax revenue. The income
expenditure equilibrium conditions for the two countries are then
y(P)=a(y(P),P,g)+x, (9a)
y*(p)a*(y*(p),p,g*)_x. (9b)
Here net exports (the current account balance of the home country) x is
residually determined by income y less absorption a. With only one good
there are no terms-of-trade effects. This simplification will be removed in
section 3 below. With two countries, x enters negatively in (9b). The partial
derivatives of a are signed ay >0, ap <0, a9 >0 (= 1), and similarly for a*.
The equilibrium world price level P is obtained by equating income less
absorption at home to absorption less income abroad,
ya= _(y*_a*). (10)20 WH. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity
Here we sum the excess demand functions in the two countries and find the
price level at which world excess demand is zero.
The next step is to derive expressions for the effects of change in demand
policy and g and g* on the price level. The effects on outputs y and ywill
follow immediately from the supply functions. The effects on the current
account x can then be solved from (9a) or (9b). Total differentiation of (10)




Remember ag= 1. The effect of demand expansion on the price level does not
depend on where it originates. The parameters / and'' are Keynesian-type
multipliers.
The effect of demand expansion on net exports can be solved from the
total differential of (9a),
dx= (12)
An exogenous increase in home demand reduces x; an increase in foreign
demand increases x. If bothgand g* rise by the same amount, the effect on x
depends on the net absorption coefficientsand If4>",a balanced
expansion increases x since net absorption falls more at home than abroad.
The increase in outputs y and y' that follows from an increase ingorg*
are simply dy=y,dP and dy*=ydP. Thus if the supply curves have positive
slopes, both levels of output and employment are increased by a demand
expansion in either country.
2.3. The role qf. wage rigidities
We can now use the one-commodity model to study the effects of differing
wage rigidities on response to changes in demand policy. To be specific, let
us assume that in the home country the real wage is rigid above equilibrium,
while in the foreign country the nominal wage is rigid. Thusw=3,W= Wa',
by assumption. What are the consequences for the effects of a demand
expansion?
First, with a real-wage rigidity at home y,=O and4in eq.(11) reduces to
a,,. When the price level rises, there is an effect on absorption in the real-W H. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity 21
wage country, but no effect on output. The reaction of the world price level
with this pattern of wage rigidities is given by
dP
1(dg+dg*). (13) as,
The source of the demand disturbances still does not matter, but the price
multiplier is increased from eq. (11) by elimination of they output effect.
The expression for dx in eq. (12) is also changed by substitution of- a for
. It is still the case that dx/dg<0 and dx/dg* >0, but it is more likely that
a balanced increase in g and g* decreases x because of the zero supply
response in the home coUntry.
To summarize, an increase in g in the real-wage country (a) increases P,
and by more than in a world with no real-wage rigidity, (b) increases output
only in the other country, and (c) reduces the trade surplus in the real-wage
country. ThusfGermany were the real-wage country and the U.S. were the
nominal-wage country, a fiscal expansion in Germany would be inflationary
and reduce the German trade balance, but all the output and employment
effects would appear in the U.S.
This model can be generalized easily to a world of several countries, some
with real-wage rigidities, some with nominal-wage rigidities. A demand
expansion originating anywhere in the system will raise the price for all, but
increase output and employment only where nominal pricesare rigid. The
trade surplus(deficit) will be reduced (increased) in the area where the
demand expansion originated, and a balanced expansion of demand will
reduce the trade surplus of the real-wage countries.
2.4. Effect of capital stock expansion
Expansion of the capital stock in one country will increase supply in that
country, drive down the world price level, and in general reduce output in
the other country. We can see this by putting (8a) and (8b) fory andy* into
the equilibrium conditions (9a) and (9b), inserting these into (10) for the




If the home (unstarred) country increases its capital stock, its output rises
unambiguously. The expression for dy is
dY=YK(1yp(l a
)
Since y,(l a)<, dy/dK>0.22 WH. Branson anti J.J. Rotemherg, International adjustment with wage rigidity
If the real wage in the home country is rigid above equilibrium, so that y,,
=0, capital stock expansion can increase output to the point where the wage
rigidity is no longer binding on the side of the demand for labor. Thus one
policy to escape the wage rigidityis incentives for investment. This was
Giersch's conclusion for West Germany. However, by reducing the world
price level P, this policy would tend to reduce output abroad unless y=0.
3. Adjustment with differentiated product bundles
The clear-cut results of section 2 were derived in a framework with only
one good and one world price level. The sharpness of these results is reduced
when we go to a world of differentiated product bundles with different prices.
In reality the industrial countries trade products that can be roughly
aggregated into bundles of exportables and importables, with the possibility
of terms-of-trade changes between them. To capture the effects of movements
in the terms of trade, we turn to a model in which the two countries produce
different goods. These can be thought of as different fixed-weight product
bundles with their associated price indexes. Introduction of two goods, and
two prices, changes fundamentally the characterization of both the supply
and demand sides of the model, and makes the signs of the effects of
expansionary policy in either country on both outputs depend on particular
parameter values.
3.1. The demand side with two commodities
In this section we develop a fairly standard two-country Keynesian model
with two goods. The two goods are the home exportable y with a price index
P, and the foreign exportable y with a price indexIn this framework we
again studyhe effects of differing wage rigidities,i.e.,aggregate supply
specifications, on the effectiveness of demand policy in influencing output.
On the demand side we have the usual absorption equation for an open
economy,
y=a(y,P,g)+x(P/eP*). (14)
The consumer price index entering absorption is a function of the home and
foreign prices,
fi=o(P,P*),Op,O0, Op+O=1. (15)
The restriction on the sum of O andfollows from specification ofPas a
weighted average of P and P, and the initial normalization P=P*W.H. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, international adjustment with wage rigidity 23





Here x,<O is the derivative of x with respect to eP/P*. From (16) we can
write the demand function for y,
y=V(P,P*,g),l',<O,l'.>O,F,>0. (17)
The partial derivatives of V are the coefficients in eq. (16) above.T' >0
assumes that the terms-of-trade effect outweighs the absorption effect when
the foreign price level* rises. If the home good share in the consumption
bundle is at least equal to the import share, then V;I>IT';I. This
condition is not necessary since x enters J'while - x enters
3.2. Aggregate supply with two commodities
On the supply side we first develop expressions for labor market supply,
demand, and equilibrium, and then show how these are affected by the
existence of wage rigidities above equilibrium levels.
The production functioniseq. (1) of section 2, where output isthe
exportable good. The usual demand function for labor is given in eq. (2)
above: W/P=yN(N). As an alternative we also introduce the possibility that
producers have market power in both home and foreign markets, and can
effectively prevent entry in the short run. In this case, both the home and
foreign prices would enter the demand function for labor,
W/P=y(N), (18)
with P defined by
,(p,p*), í+p=1. (19)
In the competitive case P=P, and Ji,=l. However, (19) provides the price
index for a discriminating monopolist producing at home and selling in both
markets.3 In the algebra that follows, the competitivecase can be obtained
by setting l'.,=l and
The labor-supply function makes the real wage demanded a function of the
level of employment, with the nominal wage deflated by theconsumer price
index P defined earlier in eq. (15). Thus labor supply is given by
W/P=g(N),g,>O. (20)
3For detailed analysis and proof, see appendix A.
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Equilibrium in the labor market equates the nominal supply wage from (20)
to the demand wage from (18),
Pg(N)=Py(N). (21)
Total differentiation of (21) plus the production function (1) gives us the




Here we have set all prices at unity initially. It may help to note that this
implies also that initial w=g=y=l.
From (22) we can write the general form of the supply function for y as
y=A(P,P*),AO, A,,.0. (23)
The signs of the partial derivatives of (23) are the coefficients of (22), where
we assume i/i,,.. This simply says the weight of foreign prices in the
worker's CPI is larger than it is in the firms' profits function.
An interesting property of the A supply function should be noted here. If
workers focus on the real wage, correctly measured, in making the labor-
supply decision, then Together with this implies that
A,,= -4,,.;the supply function is symmetric with respect to the two prices.
3.3. The role of wage rigidities
We can now introduce wage rigidities on thesupply side as special cases of
(22) and (23). Consider first the case in which the real wage is rigid above
equilibrium. We interpret this as an infinitely elastic supply curve for labor at
the rigid wageiii,so that the supply function (20) becomes
w/P = (20')
and in (22),g=0.
This simply removes gfrom (22) and (23), not changing the qualitative
slopes of (23). Thus going to a two-good model fundamentally changes the
'classical' effect of the real-wage rigidity. With the two price indexes entering
differently in producers' demand for labor and in workers' supply, a change
of either price influences output supplied, with oy/aP >0 and äy/ÔP* <0 even
with a real-wage rigidity. This will eliminate some of the sharp results of the
one-commodity model.
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To impose a nominal-wage rigidity, we re-write (20) as
W=W; (20N)
in addition to g,,=O, 1 no longer enters the supply function. This eliminates
O and Ofrom (22) and (23). In the usual case of tfr.,=1, this takes us back
to the supply function of section 2, eq. (5), withy/3P= -1IYNN.
With complete wage rigidity, or complete 'money illusion' in labor supply,
0,, and 0,,.=O, since the price level does not enter the labor-supply function
as it affects the level of employment. With flexible nominal wages and no
money illusion, O,,+O,,.=l. In an intermediate case of partial money illusion,
the labor force would 'perceive' a price index with O, + O,, < 1. The perceived
price index could be thought ofas the actual CPI raised to a power less than
unity:Pwith ot<i.t
To summarize, real-wage rigidity would eliminate gfrom (22) and
nominal-wage rigidity would further eliminate U, and Both types of
rigidity would leave us with the supply function (23) with A>0. The sign of
A,,., the cross-price effect on supply, is less clear. Normally A.<0. However,
in the case where tfi,, =1, complete nominal-wage rigidity would eliminate*
from the A supply function. If is sufficiently large compared to Up" then
A,,.>0.
3.4. Demand and supply in the 'foreign' country
Eqs.(17) and (23) give demand and supply in the home country as
funëtions of the two price levels. At this level of generality, demand and
supply in the foreign country are mirror images. The only point to note
especially is that the trade balance at home must equal the deficit abroad.
Thus the demand equation in the foreign country is solved from
y* =a* (y*,P*, g*)_x(eplp*). (24)
The foreign demand equation is then
y*v*(p,p*,g*),V>0, V,<O, V.>0. (25)
The supply equation is
y*A*(p,p*),A0, A.0. (26)
The entire discussion for wage rigidities, etc., in the home case applies in the
'foreign' case as well.
Given the values of the two demand policy variables g and g*, the two
demand functions, eqs. (17) and (25), and the supply functions equations,
4See Branson and Kievorick (1969) for use of this parameterization of money illusion.26 W.H. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity
eqs. (23) and (26), give us four equations in the variables y, y", p, p* These
already include the restriction that the trade balance x is the same for both
countries. Next we study the properties of this equilibrium by considering the
effect of a demand increase dg in the home country.
3.5. Expansionary demand policy in one country
We analyze the effect of expansionary demand policy in the home country
under a variety of institutional assumptions concerning wage rigidity. It will
be apparent that these have impacts on the results for the effectiveness of
fiscal policy. The model is summarized in eqs. (17), (23), (25) and (26).
Totally differentiating these we obtain the followng linear system:
This is the product of the own effects of price changes less the product of the
cross effects. The discussion after eq. (17) led us to notice that the own
demand effects are larger than the cross demand effects. Furthermore, in
general, the own supply effects are larger than or equal to the cross supply
effects. Therefore, A can in general be taken to be positive.
The comparative status of the model of eq. (27) following an increase in g
are summarized below,
The numerator of eq. (29) for dy/dg is essentiallyF;times the own price
effects less cross-price effects. Therefore in general we expect it to be positive.
A major exception would be when home supply is insensitive to prices; then
dy/dg=O. The numerator of (30) contains only characteristics of the 'foreign'
country. When the foreign supply function is symmetric with respect to the
10 A A dy 0
oiAz' A', dy* 0






The determinant is given by
A =(VA)(V.A) - (V A.)(V A'). (28)
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two prices, the sign of dy*/dg depends on the relative absolute values of the
demand effects, and is therefore negative.5 We return to a detailed analysis of
(29) and (30) below.
The condition thatLI>0 is required to obtain the result that an increase in
g will increase both P and* in (31) and (32). If A <0, an increase in g will
decrease P and The P,* solution for an increase in g is illustrated in
fig. 3. There, the PP lineisthe combination of P and* that yields
equilibrium in the home market. The equation for this line is
(VA)dP= - ( V_A,)dP*_ Fdg.
For a given g, the slopeis (l',A)/( I',AA4. The** lineis the
combination of P and P* that yields equilibrium in the foreign country. The
equation forPPis
(V A)dP= _(V_A.)dP*.
Jf p*p* is flatter than PP then A is positive and an increase in g raises both
prices along ** as in fig. 3. If P"P' were steeper than PP then an increase
in g would lower both prices.
3.6. Effects on real output
In analyzing the comparative statics effects on y and yof a change in g,
p0 p
Fig. 3. Increase in g in two-commodity model.
5This is the result obtained by Argy and Salop (1978).28 WH. Branson andJ.i. Rotentherg, International adjustment with wage rigidity
we will study the cases in which the 'home' country has no money illusion,
so that O,+O,==l. Whether the real wage is rigid will effect only the size of
the multipliers, with g,O. For the 'foreign' countrywe will vary the
assumptionsacrossseveralofthedifferingcasesof wagerigidity
distinguished earlier. These are
Rigid nominal wages, with O=O=0, and '=1,
Rigid real wages, withOIi,
Rigid real wages, with
Sticky nominal wages, with 0 +<1.
Clearlythisisonly a small subsetof the possible combinationsof
assumptions for wage behavior in both countries, as is obvious fromeqs.
(29) and (30).
The four cases are summarized in table 3. In the first case,even with no
money illusion at home, demand expansion increases home output through
the differential effects of P and*on home supply. In section 2 with one
commodity and corresponding price, dy/dg=0. This may be the proper case
to associate with Giersch.
An important thing to note about cases 2 and 3 is that our resultsare
commodity and corresponding price, dy/dg=0. The first case in table 3may
be the proper case to associate with Giersch.
in either country will not affect supply in that country.
If the foreign country (i.e., the one that does not expand) has a fixed real
wage while workers are more sensitive to the cross-price than are firms
(case 2), the expansion at home is contractionary abroad. This result is the
one obtained by Argy and Salop, Sachs, and Bruno and Sachs. However,
Table 3
Effects of demand expansion on output.
Assumptions on wage behavior Effects on outputs
Home Foreign dy/dg dy*/dg
No money illusion(1) Rigid nominal wage
(Op<'p) O=O.=O (.= I) + (Giersch case) +













Same (4) Sticky money wage
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there are two caveats to this result. These are shown in cases 3 and 4.
Enough money illusion in the foreign country will make the increase in g
expansionary there, as in case 4. By 'enough' we mean that
(u/J*,_O*.)(V*+ V.) p
v*
In general the right-hand side of (33) will be close to unity since (a) V + V.
is small relative to Vi'., and (b) (,fr'..O.) is between minus one and one.
Therefore it takes but a little money illusion to reverse the contractionary
effect abroad of an increase in g at home. A final caveat is that if in the
foreign-country firms are more sensitive to the cross-price than are workers,
a rare case of which Hong Kong may be an example, then our increase in g
is expansionary abroad.
4. Empirical results on money illusion and wage rigidity
To test for the existence of money illusion or wage rigidity we begin by
specifying a labor-supply equation making the level of the nominal wage
dependent on the expected price level and a measure of labor demand. A
time trend is added to account for productivity growth and trends in the
variables. An estimating form of this static model would be
ln=c+c lnP+ci2lnD1 +a3t+. (34)
Here PC represents the expected price level, D is a measure of labor demand,
proxied below by real GNP, and the time trend is included to derend W, P,
and D.
If the coefficient cwere unity, money illusion would be absent and the
real-wage cases of sections 2 and 3 with O+O=l are relevant. If in
addition2isinsignificant, the real wage would be rigid in the relevant
period and g=O in sections 2 and 3. If cwere less than unity, money
illusion exists (O+O<l), and the extreme case would have=0.
Estimation of (34) directly would assume that wages adjust within a
quarter to changes on their determinants. The literature on wage equations
shows clearly that this is not the case. We have estimated equations in the
form of (34), and observed generally quite significant serial correlation in the
residuals. These equations using instrumental variables for PC and D, as
described in detail below, and the CochranOrcutt adjustment for serial
correlation,are shown in appendix B. The first-orderserialcorrelation
coefficients p are generally in the 0.7 to 0.9 range, and the U.K. shows
evidence of higher-order correlation. This can be taken as evidence that there
(33)30 WH. Branson(flu! J.J.Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity
is a lagged adjustment process moving wage rates, adjusting the average
wage toward the static supply of labor schedule, whatever its slope. This
friction could be due to the existence of long-term (more than one quarter)
contracts, in nominal or real terms.
In a dynamic context we wish to test whether the adjustment process is in
terms of real or nominal wages, and how sensitive it is to demand conditions.
Thus the question is whether itis today's real wage that depends on past
real wages and current labor-market conditions or today's nominal wage that
depends on past nominal wages and current labor-market conditions. The
former adjustment mechanism (which results for instance from indexed
contracts) implies that our model is neutral to fiscal policy in the absence of
terms-of-trade effects. The latter corresponds to the presence of 'money
illusion'.
Let us reinterpret the static supply of labor function in eq. (34) as giving
the target wage W",
In W'=lnP+;lnD,+x2t+;. (35)
We consider only models of the partial adjustment type. Nominal-wage
stickiness is given by
ln(I4'/_1)=A(lnW7/l4'_1). (36)
Real-wage stickiness is given by
(37)
These two equations leadto two different short-run supply of labor
schedules. Using (35) and (36) we obtain for the nominal case,
in (l4'/P)(A 1) In (P/T4ç_) + 2cin D1 +22t+ 2,. (38)
Using (35) and (37) we obtain for the real-wage case,
ln(T'/P)=(1i)ln(J4ç_1/P11)+uc1 lnD,+pc2t+w1. (39)
These two models are non-nested. We can embed both hypotheses in a more
'general'adjustment mechanism which combines (36) and (37)inthe
following manner:
ln(I4''l4')=;1ln(W/Ui)+y2ln(Pern). (40) (/ ziWH. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity 31
Here if Y2 =0, we have eq. (36) representing nominal-wage adjustment; ifY2
= 1 y1 we have eq. (37) instead. Substituting (36) for W into (40) we
obtain the estimating equation
in(J4/P)=(y1 +'/2 1)ln (P/W_1)+y2ln(I4'_/P,_1)
(41)
+yj; lnD+y1ci2t+y1e.
This is the common alternative hypothesis against which we test (38) and
(39). We can compare the three equations directly. If 'y=0, Vs in (41) is equal
to A in (38); if Y2 = 1 yr, then Y2 is also equal to (1 t) in eq. (39).
We reject the hypothesis that it is the real wage that adjusts according to
eq. (37) if the coefficient on in (P/14'_1) is significantly different from zero.
On the other hand we reject eq. (36)if the estimate of Y2in(41)is
significantly different from zero. Of course the models are indistinguishable
when the adjustment is instantaneous, i.e., Yi = 1, Y =0.
The estimating eq. (41) is derived from specification of an equation for the
level of the nominal wage, (34) or (35), dependent on the level of demand,
and a standard adjustment mechanism. This is a different procedure from
that followed by Bruno and Sachs (1979),6 Gordon (1977), and Spitaelier
(1976). In particular, their specification assumes that the level of demand
affects the rate of change of wages, while a simple differencing of eq. (41)
would put the change in demand into the equation for the change in the
wage rate. This difference must be kept in mind in interpreting our results
below.
In estimating eq. (41) for five major OECD countries, we used price data
from the OECD Main Economic Indicators and GNP data from the
International Financial Statistics published by the IMF. The D1 variable is
real GNP for all countries except Italy where it is real GDP. The dependent
variable is hourly compensation, provided by the IMF.7 The price variable is
the Consumer Price Index. All variables were seasonally adjusted using the
X-11 method.
We estimated all equations using instrumental variable estimates for PC
and GNP. For each country regressions were performed of the CPI and
GNP on four lagged values of CPI and GNP plus the current and four
lagged values of the money stock. Fitted values from these regressions were
used in the wage equation for pe and GNP. These are denoted as P and
GNP in table 4 below. This procedure can be interpreted econometrically as
6Bruno and Sachs' specification involves a partial adjustment of the rate of change of wages
to the equilibrium rate of change of wages which depends on GNP. This leads to an equation
similar to (41). We are working on a paper that tests their specification directly against our 'real'
and 'nominal' wage adjustment models.
7We also estimated the equations using hourly earnings and the hourly wage as dependent
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eliminating the simultaneity bias running from the real wage to GNP and
the CPI. or as imposition of rational expectations on the wage equation.
We estimated eq. (41) with quarterly observations for two periods, one
running from 1961 to 1978, the other from 1971 to 1978. This was done
because the latter period exhibits a higher rate of inflation and it is likely
that workers are more sensitive to the price level when its increases are
larger. Furthermore, the period 197 1-78 saw a large increase in oil prices
which should have led to a reduction in the equilibrium real wage, therefore
making this an ideal period to test the rigidity of the real wage. Equations in
Phillips curve form have been estimated for the period 1958-73 quarterly by
Gordon, for the period 1957-72 semi-annually by Spitaeller, and for the
period 1962-76 annually by Bruno and Sachs.
The estimates of eq. (41) are shown in table 4. In all cases the dependent
variable is W1/P. There are two equations for each country, one for the full
period 1961-78, and one for the shorter period 1971-78. The coefficients are
presented with their standard errors in parentheses. In the last column of the
table we give the result of the test of real- vs. nominal-wage adjustment. R
means that the real-wage hypothesisisaccepted and the nominal-wage
hypothesis is rejected, and vice versa for N. The R, N entries signify that
neither hypothesis can be rejected.
The first thing we notice in table 4 is that the coefficient of the demand
variable GNP is significantly positive in all countries for the full period, but
insignificant for 1971-78. This says that in each of these countries wage
movements became less sensitive to demand variation in the 1970s than
earlier; in terms of our theoretical model g, = 0.
Turning to the real- vs. nominal-wage issue, we see that the U.S. is the
only country where the nominal-wage adjustment model dominates. The
coefficient of T4'1/P1 is effectively zero for both periods, and the estimate
of the ,l adjustment coefficient in the money wage model is approximately
0.7. This result is consistent with the earlier findings of Bruno and Sachs
(1979), Gordon (1977), and Spitaeller (1976). The U.K. regressions yield
ambiguous results. The nominal-wage model is rejected over the full period,
but neither hypothesis can be rejectedin the 1971-78 period. On the
presumption that the real-wage model isaccepted, the estimate of thei
adjustment coefficient is approximately 0.45 over both periods. This fits the
result of Bruno and Sachs, but not Spitaeller.
For Japan and Italy, the nominal-wage model is rejected for both periods.
The l4'1/P,coefficient is insignificantly different from unity in all four
regressions, suggesting a long adjustment process with i close to zero. These
results are roughly consistent with the literature.
For Germany, neither hypothesis can be rejected for the full period, but
the nominal-wage model is rejected for 1971-78. As in Italy and Japan, thep
estimate is close to zero. These results are also roughly consistent with the34 WH. Branson and J.J. Rotemberg, International adjustment with wage rigidity
literature. Gordon and Spitaeller found money illusion in earlier data sets
ending in 1972 and 1973, respectively, and Bruno and Sachs reject it on data
through 1976.
In summary, it seems that sensitivity of wage movements to fluctuations in
demand has been reduced sharply in the 1970s relative to the earlier period
in all five countries. The U.S. is the only country in which the model of
nominal-wage stickiness is supported; in the U.K., Japan, Italy and Germany
itis the real wage that adjusts slowly. This is consistent with effective
indexation in these countries as compared with the U.S.
In terms of the model in sections 2 and 3, only the U.S. seems to have
enough money illusion to bring about an expansion in response to third
country increases in demand. On the other hand, money illusion appears to
be absent in the U.K., Germany, Italy, and Japan. This means that these
countries may have to worry about the effect of expansionary fiscal policy in
the other countries.
Appendix A
Consider a discriminating monopolist producing in the h me country and
selling in two countries. He faces the following problem:
Max {p(q) .q+p*(q*,u)q* - W .(q+q*)},
where p(q) and p*(q*) are the inverse demand functions,the employment
function with>O and u a shift parameter such that for a higher u
the foreigners are willing to pay more for each quantity q*. p>O. We
assume further PU*q* = 0. His first-order conditions are
pqq+p1447,p.q*+p*=T441'.
Totally differentiating with a change in u gives us
(pqqq+2pq)dq Wn'(dq+dq*)=0,
(p.q,q* + 2p*)dq*- Wy" (dq +dq*) =- p du.
Assuming Pqq=Pq*q*O, we obtain
which leads to
(dq+dq*)/du>0,dq*/du>0.
This means that an increase in demand in any one country leads to an
increase in demand for labor by the firm. We have written this as a demand-
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COMMENTS
'International Adjustment with Wage Rigidity' by Branson and Rotemberg
Jeffrey SACHS
National Bureauof EconomicResearch, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
In 'International Adjustment with Wage Rigidity', William Branson and Julio
Rotemberg turn our attention to the recent trans-oceanic debate over macro-
economic policy. Since 1974, when the industrialized countries entered the
'Great Recession', the U.S. has been urging expansionary monetary and fiscal
policy in Japan and the European countries. Most of these countries have
been adamant in rejecting the U.S. advice. The different countries' choices
reflect more than different tastes for inflation and unemployment in the short
run. Branson and Rotemberg share the view of Giersch (1979) and Bruno
and Sachs (1979) that the U.S. has chosen expansionary policy because it
works in the U.S., while the same policy is likely to cause inflation and little
else in the other economies:1
As in the earlier papers, Branson and Rotemberg point to the labor
market as the source of this difference. In countries with nominal-wage
rigidity, expansionary policy can reduce the real wage and thus increase
aggregate supply; in rigid real-wage countries, ipso fticto,it cannot. Their
empirical work is devoted to finding which countries are in which category.
In all their regressions, the U.S. comes through as a rigid nominal-wage
economy.
The spirit of their approach is just right. Their focus on excessive real
wages after 1973 is appropriate. I concur in the view that industrialized
economies behave differently, and that economists must continue to sort out
thosedifferences.However,Isuspectthat Branson and Rotemberg's
empirical work needs more sorting out itself. While they ask the broad
questions correctly, they do not specily the narrow empirical questions with
'In Bruno and Sachs (1979, p.45) we wrote: 'We suspect that much of the difference in the
macro-economic policy recommendations of American and European economists stems from the
difference in the behavior of their respective economies reflected in &2 [a parameter of nominal-
wage rigidity]. In the United States monetary policyis effective, while in most European
economies, monetary policy probably operates chiefly on prices and not on output.'38 J. Sachs, Comments on the Branson and Role,nherg paper
sufficient care. And when they try to answer the empirical questions, their
results are diminished by econometric difficulties.
The theoretical model in the paper traces out the role of real wages in
aggregate supply, along familiar lines. The empirical work seeks to answer
two key questions about wage setting. The first is whether real-wage growth
can vary fast enough to keep the wage approximately equal to the marginal
product of labor at full employment. The second is whether expansionary
policy, by raising the price level, can reduce the real wage and expand
aggregate output.
On the first question, the authors do not attempt to compare wage
movements directly with marginal labor productivity. Rather, they test
whether the adjustment of real wages to a target level is rapid, and whether
the target itself is a function of aggregate demand. They conclude that real-
wage adjustment in Europe and Japan is sluggish, and that the target does
not depend on aggregate output. In sum, they find that real-wage growth
since 1971isfairlyconstant. Their findings,Ithink, are hindered by
problems in the empirical work, to which I return. A glance at the data
should be enough to dissuade us from their simple rigid real-wage model. In
table 1, I show the growth rates of real hourly compensation and real hourly
earnings for the seven large industrial countries. The striking aspect of the
table for Europe and Japan is not the fixity of real-wage growth, but the
opposite. A real-wage explosion hits Europe and Japan during 1969-73,
while during the recent recession, real-wage growth falls sharply. In every
country outside of North America, high unemployment severely curtails the
rise in real hourly compensation after 1975.
Table 1
Annual growth rates of real hourly compensation and real hourly earnings in manufacturing;
1962-78.
Source:Nominal hourly compensation and hourly earnings from U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of LaborStatistics,OfficeofProductivity and Technology, 'Estimated Hourly
Compensation of Production Workers in Manufacturing, Ten Countries, 1960, 1965-1978', and
other publications of the Office of Productivity and Technology. The consumer price index is
from the IFS.
Real hourly compensation Real hourly earnings
Country1962-691969-731973-751975-1977 1962-691969-731973-751975-77
Canada 2.9 3.4 3.8 4.3 2.6 3.6 3.4 4.2
France 4.2 5.9 6.4 4.9 4.1 5.4 4.4 4.8
Germany5.1 7.9 7.2 4.1 4.8 5.3 3.2 2.8
Italy 6.2 11.7 7.4 2.1 4.4 11.2 5.1 6.4
Japan 7.6 9.5 5.2 0.0 8.0 10.1 4.3-0.3
U.K. 2.9 4.3 6.0 -1.8 3.1 5.0 2.8 -3.1
U.S. 1.9 1.5 .0.8 2.2 1.4 1.4 -1.2 2.1J. Sachs, Comments on the Branson and Rotemberg paper 39
The deceleration in real wages does not vitiate the concern over excessive
wage levels, but only the simple test of wage rigidity in the paper. In fact,
real-wage growth did not drop fast enough after 1973 to match the slower
growth of the full-employment marginal product of labor. Almost all of the
industrialized countries faced a severe drop in total productivity growth and
an adverse terms-of-trade shift after 1973.2 These disturbances have required
a slowdown in real hourly compensation growth of at least one to two
percentage points a year since 1973. In fact, the slowdown in compensation
only came with a long lag. Consequently the cyclically adjusted share of
labor compensation rose almost everywhere following the oil shock, and
profits were squeezed, with theimplications for aggregate supply and
employment that Branson and Rotemberg describe. In table 2, 1 show the
share of labor compensation. In France, Germany, Japan and the United
Kingdom, labor's share rises markedly during 1973-76.
Table 2
Share of labor compensation in manufacturing value-added, cyclically adjusted.'
'Source:The share of labor compensation is calculated as the ratio of employee compensation
to gross domestic product originating in manufacturing, measured at factor cost. An adjustment
is made by multiplying the share by the ratio of output per manhour to potential outputper
manhour, calculated by Artus (1977), and updated by the IMF. The underlying compensation
and GDP data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and
Technology.
Branson and Rotemberg correctly ask what the role of policy might be in
the face of excessive real wages, the second issue raised above. Their model
suggests that nominal-wage stickiness gives scope for policy. Again, their
empirical specification does not face the question at hand. In their 'static'
model (section 4), they test the long-run neutrality of the real wage with
respect to the price level; in the dynamic case, it is the neutrality of the real
wage with respectto theinflationrate.In both cases, nominal-wage
stickiness is made synonymous with a long-run Phillips curve trade-off. But
surely the issue of nominal-wage rigidity is a matter of short-run stickiness in
2Artus (1975) has estimated a decline in total factor productivity of 2.6% for the large
industrial economies. For alternative estimates of the productivity decline, and measures of the
terms-of-trade shift, see Sachs (1979).
1962-641965-691970-731974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Canada 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.69 na. n.a.
France 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52
Germany 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 n.a.
Italy 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.65
Japan 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.60
U.K. 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.75 na.
U.S. 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.8140 3. Sachs, Comments on the Branson and Rotemberg paper
nominal-wage change, perhaps due to long-term contracts, rather than a
proposition about the long-term determinationof the real-wagelevel.
Because the BransonRotemberg tests of wage sluggishness do not allow for
short-run rigidities and long-run inflation neutrality, their conclusions should
not be directly compared to the results in Bruno and Sachs (1979).
Why do Branson and Rotemberg find so little effect of demand on real
wages in the 1971-78 period, even though high unemployment led to a clear
real-wage deceleration after1975? The answer is not clear, thoughis
probably related to the econometric procedures. First, the authors use GNP
(with a time trend) to proxy for labor market activity. This is unwarranted.
During a period of stable productivity growth, Okun's law allows us to
translate unemploymentto GNP, but duringaperiodofdeclining
productivity growth, the GNP variable will indicate looser labor markets
than indeed exist.
More importantly, the estimation is subject to biases. How do we know
that the regression of wages on output identifies a labor-supply schedule,
with a positive coefficient on output, rather than an output-supply schedule,
with a negative coefficient? Presumably, the answer isthe instrumental
variables procedure. But the choice of instruments is suspect. In the first
stage of estimation, quarterly GNP data isfit with thirteen instruments,
including four lags of GNP. The lagged values of GNP are almost surely not
valid instruments (serial correlation in the wage equation bars their use), and
the over-fitting of the first stage probably contributes to inconsistency. The
concern over simultaneous equation bias is not a cavil, since so much of the
authors' theory relies on the negative link of wages and output supply. Also,
the equation is estimated with a lagged dependent variable, but with no
attention to serial correlation. Our concern here is justified. The authors'
theory suggests that the coefficient on I41/P1_should lie between zero and
one this is in fact so for only three of the ten regressions. The suspicion of
misspecification is heightened by DurbinWatson statistics generally far from
2.0, and the unexplained instability of the regression coefficients across sub-
periods.
Ibelieve that econometric equations will take us only part way in
elucidating the differencesin wage determination among countries. We
should spend more time trying to link observable institutions with wage
outcomes. For instance, nominal-wage sluggishness in the U.S. is consistent
with the preponderance of long-term overlapping contracts, as shown in the
theoretical work of Fisher (1977) and Taylor (1979). The absence of
discernible nominal-wage stickiness in Germany, on the other hand, probably
'lii time empirical estimates in Bruno and Sachs (1979), the wage equation is specified so that
theeat economy is neutral with respect to the steady-state rate of inflation. In Sachs (1979),
statistical tests fail to reject the hypothesis of long-run neutrality in the wage equation for the
seven iare OECD economies.J. Sachs, Comments on the Branson and Rotemherg paper 41
results from short-term contracts, negotiated at branch levels, in the context
of the 'Concerted Action' policy. Similarly, institutional detail can helpus to
explain the sharp deceleration in real wages after 1975 in countries suchas
the U.K., where income policies contributed, along with high unemployment,
to the real-wage deceleration.
Branson and Rotemberg have shownus why theissueof wage
determination is important. I look forward to further empirical application of
their model.
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COMMENTS
'International Adjustment with Wage Rigidity' by Branson and Rotemberg
Richard PORTES
Centre d'Economie Quantitative et Comparative, Paris, France
Birkbeck College, University of London, UK
The paper by Branson and Rotemberg is an excellent example of the use of
an apparently simple model to throw theoretical light on a complex and
controversial policy question, as well as to give guidance for empirical
specification. American policy-makers have resented the reluctance of Europe
and Japan to adopt expansionary policies since 1974, in part because they
have seen no basis for such caution in the face of substantial and growing
unemployment throughout the OECD area. Europe and Japan, on the other
hand, have resented what they see as American unwillingness to comprehend
the obvious, namely that demand expansion would for them raise prices
rather than employment and output. Branson and Rotemberg, starting from
a suggestion by Giersch, have produced a model which makes sense of these
divergent positions, albeit under some fairly strong simplifying assumptions.
The theoretical argument is for the most part quite neat and clear, and it
contains a particularly appealing feature, the willingness to apply/explicitly
the 'minimum condition' from the quantity-rationing models to the labor
market. With just a single market in 'disequilibrhim', one does get only some
of the characteristic responses of this class of models, but they come at a low
cost, without much of their complexity. Nevertheless, I think it would be
feasible to incorporate some repercussions from the goods market onto the
labor market, and I shall return to this below.
In the paper, the labor marketistaken as an aggregate (contrast
Muellbauer and Winter), and only the case of excess supply is considered as
an alternative to equilibrium. The goods market in each country clears
through trade as in Dixit's (1978) model of a single small open economy, but
here this market clearing comes through price adjustment, whereas in Dixit
the domestic wage and price levels are rigid. Thus although he too has
'classical' unemployment, his labor market is unaffected by fiscal policy,
which influences only the balance of trade. In both, excess supply in the
labor market has only one cause: whether because of rigidity of the moneyR. Portes, Comments on the Branson and Rotemherg paper 43
or of the real wage, the real wage in equilibrium is too high, and the
marginal productivity condition determines the demand for labor at a level
below supply, with no 'spillover' from the goods market.
Here, however, in the two-good case, the marginal productivity condition
which determines unemployment involves a different price index from that
faced (or perceived - see below) by workers. Thus a wage which is rigid for
workers is not rigid for employers. Workers are assumed to put more weight
on foreign prices than employers do. While neither of the two economies is
'small', the stress is on their 'openness', the precise extent of which indeed
determines the model's properties. The fundamental equation is (22), which
very neatly expresses the effects of the differences between the price indices
and allows an exceedingly simple incorporation of the 'disequilibrium'
features of the model through eqs. (20N) and (2O').
I found one confusing point in the specification, in regard to the workers'
price index. Initially, in the discussion of the demand for output and eq. (15),
this price index is treated as a measured CPI, i.e., as a weighted average of
the domestic and foreign prices. In the subsequent discussion of the supply of
labor, however, following eq. (20N), money illusion is represented by reference
to the properties of a perceived CPI. Moreover, one is tempted to confuse
nominal-wage rigidity with money illusion, although it is only their effects on
the role of this price index which may be represented similarly.
The properties of the model are summarized in table 3, which is somewhat
less complicated than it appears. Case 1 (Giersch) is a special case of case 4,
and as the text points out, relatively little money-wage rigidity will give an
unambiguously positive response of domestic demand expansion on foreign
output, so we need not worry much about the special case. The three
remaining cases all suppose rigid real wages and differ only in the relative
sensitivity of workers and firms to domestic and foreign price changes.
In fact, it seems to me that the model suggests testing directly not merely
wage rigidity, but perhaps more importantly, these differences in responses to
domestic and foreign price changes. This turns out to be the key to the
behavior of the model, and itis not immediately obvious for countries like
Japan and the U.K. (say) whether the ArgySalop, the 'classical', or the
'Hong Kong' case would be empirically appropriate.
Finally, it might not be overly complex (especially if one were to focus on
just a couple of the cases in table 3) to extend the model to allow the
possibility that the goods market might not clear, at least in one of the two
countries.We wouldthenhave'Keynesian'aswellas'classical'
unemployment [see Malinvaud (1977)]. An economy with the former would
normally have a trade surplus, though not enough to absorb all the excess
supply of goods. An economy with the latter would normally have a trade
deficit, though not so great as to satisfy all the excess demand for goods.44 R !'rle,. ('wn,nenl.s on i/u' Branson am! R oie;nherg paper
Evidently inthis sense the non-clearing goods market in a large open
economy is more plausible for the Keynesian than for the classical case.
If the domestic economy isin Keynesian unemployment, expansionary
fiscal policy raises wages, prices, employment and output, while reducing net
exports. Then if the foreign economy were also in Keynesian unemployment,
it would experience expansion all around as well. But if unemployment
abroad were classical in character, though its price level and net exports
would rise, the effect on output (and hence on employment and goods
market conditions) would differ according to the stickiness of money or real
wages. It would be very interesting to see how this argument might be
modified by the assumption that households and firms face (or perceive)
different price indices.
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